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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE BRADY
REPORT: PUBLIC INTEREST, SPECIAL
INTEREST, OR RENT EXTRACTION?
David D. Haddock t
The "Brady Report"' was compiled swiftly following events in
October 1987 during which securities prices plunged worldwide.
That report urges substantial new regulatory machinery in response
to the event that has come to be known as the "1987 market break."
But a disconcertingly large proportion of the findings, conclusions,
and recommendations lodged in the report are badly off-target from
a public interest perspective. 2 In the first place, the "market break"
of 1987 was no big deal if placed in the perspective of the following
year and compared with other similar events in the history of securities exchanges. Since World War II, four other declines in the Dow
Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) have been of a larger percentage
than the 26.1% difference between the peak of 2722 registered on
August 25, 1987, and the level of 2011 attained exactly one year
later.3 And all of those declines are minor league by the standards
of the 1920s and 1930s.
Moreover, it was the European and not the American markets
that were the first to break. 4 How then can new regulation directed
solely at United States securities markets, as is implicit in the Brady
proposals, prevent a recurrence? A serious danger exists that such
t
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See Haddock, The Swiftness of Divine Retribution, and Its Tendency to Mistake Its Target:
An Analysis of the Brady Report, in THE STOCK MARKET: BUBBLES, VOLATILITY, AND CHAOS
179 (G.Dwyer and R. Hafer eds.) (forthcoming).
3
For all the declines, the peak level is used as the denominator for the percentage"
calculation. At least three additional transitory post-war declines in the DJIA exceeded
23%5 over very roughly comparable time-spans. And several declines of similar magnitude (up to 69.5%o) occurred in the United Kingdom and Japan over the post-war period. See Greenwald & Stein, The Task Force Report. The Reasoning Behind the
Recommendations, 2 J. ECON. PERSPECTIvES 3-23, Table 1 (Summer 1988).
4
See Dwyer & Hafer, Do Fundamentals,Bubbles or Neither Explain Stock Prices? Evidence
From Seven Countries, in THE STOCK MARKET: BUBBLES, VOLATILrrY, AND CHAOS (G. Dwyer
and R. Hafer eds.) (forthcoming).

842

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:841

introspective regulation will seriously disable our national exchanges in the increasingly competitive world securities market.
Finally, nobody would have protested or called for new regulatory action if the year-long experience had resulted in a 26.1 %oincrease in security prices, even if the short-run movements had been
equally abrupt.
So why the sudden calls for extensive new regulations for
United States security exchanges? In this paper I search for an answer to that question.
I do not deny that the rapid decline during a few days of midOctober startled and troubled market professionals, costing some of
them substantial sums (but profiting a few handsomely). So did the
several transitory rebounds that interrupted the mid-October slide,
and the much more permanent one that came after the DJIA had
fallen to almost 1700 by October 20, a level that proved to be the
lowest point during the year-long span. And, indeed, it does seem
that the clearing arrangements in place in the exchanges were severely taxed during the few days of most rapid decline.
But the most remarkable features of the market break have
been the tenacity of the champions of regulatory proposals purportedly designed to "solve" a very small problem, and the continuing
highly-publicized attention (but inaction) of Congress toward an
event of little interest to most voters-even during the period of
most rapid price decline. Though commentators frequently claim
that common investors might become disillusioned and discouraged
by Congress's continuing failure to adopt new controls, the only private citizens who have taken the trouble to participate vociferously
in the regulatory debate are market professionals-those who work
in close conjunction with the securities markets. And market professionals, of course, have a strong private interest in the regulatory
outcome not necessarily consistent with the interest of the economy
as a whole.
That observation, of course, raises the possibility that the Brady
Report was not even intended as a public-interest document. Perhaps it was motivated by special-interests who are more inclined to
rationalize self-serving proposals to a skeptical public than to increase social welfare. Or perhaps it is best seen as a mere threat to
act against certain narrowly defined interests in order to extract concessions from those interests in favor of governmental actorsMcChesney's rent extraction scenario. 5 I investigate in turn each of
the alternative views of the Brady Report-public-interest, special5 McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creationin the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16
J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987).
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interest, rent-extraction-in the material below. Identifying the alternative that best characterizes the Brady Report, however, must
await the resolution of present Congressional activities.
Although regulatory proposals have arisen from many quarters,
the focus of this paper will be on those advanced in the Brady Report, so called after Nicholas F. Brady, the chairman of the Task
Force. 6 It is difficult to state the views of the Brady Commission
concisely. On a superficial level, panic, or even hysteria, are the single words that seem to reflect most accurately the tone of the rather
disjointed report-perhaps merely reflecting that the report was the
work of a committee. Whatever the explanation, the Report devotes
long passages to lamenting one inequity or another, without ever
suggesting any obvious regulatory "correction." Some of the regulatory proposals that are advanced in the Report seem hardly to have
been foreshadowed by those market failings asserted by the Commission. If the Brady Report were a legal brief, the action might
well be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, with the defense not even being required to present a rebuttal.
I
APPROPRIATE RESPONSES TO SYSTEM FAILURE

A. The View of the Brady Report
Implicit in the Brady Report, and in many alternative regulatory
proposals, are the following options: (1) cope with events similar to
the recent market break by increasing governmental regulation, or
(2) do nothing about such events at all. Also implicit is that the second option is profoundly inferior to the first. Finally, it is implicit
that the entire episode of the market break represents a conflation
of inseparable but confusing events, inappropriately dealt with in a
piecemeal fashion. As the Brady Report states: "Analysis of market
behavior during the crucial days in mid-October makes clear an important conclusion. From an economic viewpoint, what have been
traditionally seen as separate markets-the markets for stocks, stock
index futures, and stock options-are in fact one market."' 7 By implication, no aspect of the problem can be dealt with in an arena that
is fundamentally different than that in which any other aspect is ap8
proached. The Report urges a coherent, unified approach instead.
6 Brady, then an officer of an investment bank, subsequently assumed a high position in the Reagan administration despite having urged increased regulation during the
term of a supposedly deregulating administration. Brady remains in the upper echelons
of the national government at the beginning of the Bush administration.
7 Brady Report, supra note 1, at 55.
8 See id. at 59-60:
The October 1987 experience illustrates that regulatory changes, derived
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It is urged that non-specialists cannot reasonably hope to understand what has happened in the securities market during the past
year.9 Consequently, non-specialists cannot understand how the
regulatory proposals will help avoid a recurrence of the October terror in the future. Instead, it is necessary to depend on public-spirited specialists to instruct a functionally blind nation regarding
appropriate courses of action.
B.

An Alternative Viewpoint

I disagree with virtually everything summarized in the section
just concluded. At the very least, I assert that the case to back such
views has yet to be made, or even begun. And this judgment does
not depend on the reason for the market break-a change in fundamentals, the bursting of a speculative bubble, psychological factors,
or whatever-nor upon the strength of the efficient market
hypothesis.
In the first place, lots of "markets" are interrelated-many of
them closely-with no particular need for regulation implied. For
example, houses, apartments, and offices are closely related markets. Because most such buildings are covered by mortgages, those
markets are closely related to financial markets. Because the construction industry produces houses, apartments, and offices, but
also produces highways, bridges, television and radio stations, those
markets are interrelated as well. The latter items draw a connection
with the entertainment industry-films, plays, recordings-and then
on to screenplays and books. In fact, if one had nothing better to
[It] demonstrates that
the issues which have an impact across related markets, and throughout
the financial system, include clearing and credit mechanisms, margin requirements, circuit breaker mechanisms, such as price limits and trading
halts, and information systems for monitoring intermarket activities....
Moreover, the October break illustrates that difficulties in stocks and
derivative market segments produce dislocations in other financial markets. These, in turn, exacerbate the problem in stocks and derivative
market segments. ...
[The newly proposed] intermarket agency must consider the interactions among a wide variety of markets encompassing stocks, stock index
futures, stock options, bonds, foreign exchange and the credit and banking system, in both domestic and foreign markets.
9 The most fundamental requirement [of the proposed agency] is broad
and deep expertise in these market segments and instruments. However,
expertise in individual instruments and market segments is not sufficient.
The key requirement is expertise in the interaction of instruments and
marketplaces as an integrated system ....
The critical requirement for the intermarket agency is broad expertise in the financial system as a whole because the greatest potential risk
of intermarket failure is to the financial system as a whole, rather than to
individual market segments.
Id at 60.
from the one-market concept, are necessary ....
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do, it would be possible to trace out paths to virtually every market
in the world, concluding that they all are part of "one market."
And they are! It is called the economy, and no citizen, not even
an Adam Smith, completely understands the economy. Although
that may justify studying economics, it does not, in and of itselfjustify new regulation. Regulators are not some breed of intellectual
supermen who can see through matters opaque to the rest of usfar from it! Consequently, whether or not we employ regulators,
losses will befall society that could have been avoided if foresight
were as good as hindsight. Thus, an observation that such a loss has
just occurred justifies employing scarce resources in new regulatory
activity if and only if the regulator will have some advantage over
private actors. The Brady Report nowhere addresses this question
of comparative advantage. Instead, the report lists platitudes with
great thoroughness. The thoroughness of the listing serves only to
distract attention from the list's lack of important implications.
Selecting the appropriate response to a trying event, such as the
market break, is considerably more complicated and less obvious
than the Brady Report implies. In fact, it is often wise to respond to
highly unsettling events by doing nothing at all. A non-response is
desirable under at least two sets of circumstances:
First, highly unsettling events are often inevitable in the workings of markets as resources are expelled from uses that are less
valuable than the alternatives. Such events should ordinarily be ignored. Artificially retaining resources in a present activity denies
more valuable activities a full opportunity to expand, a notion
known to economists abstractly as a "constraint." Congressional inaction in view of the market break will undoubtedly discourage
some investors who have been involved in the market in certain
ways ("playing the market"). But that may be all to the good-such
people and their funds will not collapse into inaction if they are not
playing the market, they will instead turn to other pursuits where
they have a comparative advantage. Similarly, brokers will lose income, and some will be forced to find other employment as they
lose clients.1 0 Again, though brokers will be unenthusiastic about
the prospect, that frees resources for the expansion of activities that
utilize similar inputs.
Second, even if the event cannot (and possibly should not) be
ignored, responses are costly, so they are merited if and only if the
total cost of a response exceeds the total benefit, which is the cost
borne in the event of non-response. Although one easily observes
10 See, e.g., Small-Investor Brokers Lose Clients, Income In Wake of Oct. 19, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 26, 1988, at 1, col. 6.
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that regulatory responses to anything are vastly expensive propositions, to my knowledge nobody has done even a back-of-the-envelope empirical examination designed to determine whether or not
October 1987 merits any response.
Moreover, even when the totals warrant some response, the
problem being responded to ordinarily will not be obliterated by an
optimal response. The magnitude of the optimal response will be determined by the marginal cost and benefit of responding. Since the
marginal cost is often substantial, the optimal response will equally
often be one that retains a substantial probability that some similar
events will recur. It is far from clear, particularly with the benefit of
hindsight, that October 1987 was anything more than such an "optimal failure" of the system of controls already in place.
Further, even if the marginal empirical analysis (assuming it
were attempted) indicated that greater controls on securities exchange mechanisms are desirable, the controls ought to be sought
along the least costly avenues. In many instances, that will imply
private rather than governmental regulatory controls. The notion
that adequate incentives may exist to spur private institutions such
as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to continue innovating and
developing appropriate exchange controls seems alien to the Brady
Report. But even if a new governmental regulatory approach seems
desirable, the requisite powers to implement the approach may already be vested in an existing agency, such as the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).
Hence, a whole array of plausible responses to the market break
exist that involve no major new governmental regulatory action.
Only in those instances in which each and every one of those alternatives is rejected as being inappropriate does it make sense to divert
scarce Congressional attention from other important matters so that
some entirely new regulatory structure can be designed and erected.
It seems odd, from a public-interest perspective, that the Brady Report urged just such a revamped regulatory structure without ever
seriously considering any of the alternatives. And it seems odd that
members of the Brady Commission continue to bemoan the failure
of Congress to act promptly on their proposals despite the continuing scarcity of empirical evidence that the Brady proposals are actually related to the problems the Commission members claim to have
perceived during the market break. Apparently, their preferred
hardware for conducting empirical investigations is a newspaper
printing press.

847

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

1989]

II
A PUBLIC-INTEREST ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATORY
PROPOSALS

The public interest is, of course, a highly ambiguous concept."'
But for the purpose of determining whether or not the Brady Report can plausibly be represented as a public-interest document, it is
informative to adopt the relatively lenient Kaldor-Hicks standard. 12
Even under this loose standard, however, it will be shown that serious failings seem to permeate the Brady Report as a public-interest
document. The assertions of the Report to the contrary, the actual
events detailed seem to imply no need for additional government
regulation. Consider some of the major, albeit disorganized, pieces
of the Brady Report in turn.
In retrospect, it seems that the recent securities price decline
was especially remarkable only for the speed with which events occurred during the several days beginning with October 19.
Although the Brady Report discusses the speed of the price decline
unfavorably-a "free-fall"-and at length, I believe the Report perceives neither the mechanism that caused the rapid price decline nor
its economic importance.
One hypothesis that could explain the unusually rapid securities price decline is that it was merely a drawing from one tail of a
distribution describing a stochastic process. That would mean that
the speed of the October segment of the 1987 market break implies
nothing about future market breaks, and, hence, implies nothing
new concerning our understanding of the regulatory environment.
Consequently, it implies nothing obvious concerning new'regulatory initiatives. This hypothesis has not been refuted. Instead, wild
inferences are drawn from a sample of one (increasingly unimpressive) observation.
The most obvious alternative hypothesis that might account for
the speed of the October securities price drop is more optimistic.
That hypothesis would focus on evolutionary changes in the environment of securities exchanges that simply make things work faster
now than they formerly did. In other words, perhaps what happened in 1987 was the same general process that had earlier driven
the 36% decline in the DJIA from the end of 1968 through mid11

This is known as "Arrow's impossibility theorem."

CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES

See K. ARROW, SOCIAL

(2d ed. 1963).

12 Virtually every proposal in the Brady Report fails on cursory examination if a
Paretian standard were to be selected instead. For definitions of Kaldor-Hicks and
Pareto efficient actions, see W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW

13-17 (1987).
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1970, but it just got telescoped-perhaps the process is essentially
the same, but we need to deflate our clocks and calendars.
Several examples of evolutionary changes that plausibly could
speed market processes were specifically pointed to by the Brady
Report,1 3 including the initiation of block-trading and portfolio insurance. As Greenwald and Stein 1 4 note, however, such mechanisms seem not to be implicated: similar market breaks occurred
abroad even in markets and for financial instruments for which
block-trading and portfolio insurance were absent.
But suppose that Greenwald and Stein are mistaken about the
contribution of portfolio insurance to the events of October. Even
so, those portfolio insurance sales that occurred in the early part of
the break were inappropriate from neither a private nor a social
point of view-in retrospect it is seen that those sales extricated clients from the lower prices that soon prevailed (privately appropriate), and they drove securities prices more quickly toward a new
equilibrium (socially appropriate). If portfolio insurance strategies
led to inappropriate mechanical dumping of portfolios late in the
market break, that would have contributed to the overshoot that was
ultimately observed (socially inappropriate). But it also would have
contributed to decreasing the wealth of the subscribers (privately
inappropriate), so the market will issue retribution to the portfolio
insurance firms where suitable (socially appropriate). In fact, portfolio insurance in now approximately one-quarter the size it had attained prior to the market break. There seems to be no task left
with respect to portfolio insurance for a regulator to perform.
An alternative example of a suspect evolutionary change that
would have compressed market time is a general increase in the rate
at which communications of various sorts now proceed, due possibly
to advances in electronics, satellite transponders, computer
software, etc. Since essentially everyone agrees that the expected
profitability of firms at least influences securities prices-if it is not
the entire determinant-then increasingly rapid communications
that drive the DJIA more promptly toward a new equilibrium in the
face of new information is not a social ill at all, but rather a boon.
This is not to deny that rapid movements in prices will inevitably
prove a problem for certain individuals. But the gains to the winners will exceed the losses of the losers, which ends the debate
under the Kaldor-Hicks notion of social welfare adopted in this paper. Securities prices influence decisions regarding new investment.
If new information implies that investment plans should be reconfigured, the quicker that information becomes widely known the
13
14

See Brady Report, supra note 1, at 15-21.
Greenwald & Stein, supra note 3.
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fewer the inappropriate projects that are initiated. Given the rate at
which new real investment is initiated, even a rather brief delay can
lead to serious misallocations in an absolute sense.
Nevertheless, the Brady Report indicates that the rapidity of the
decline was one of the "problems" associated with the market
break.' 5 Similarly, the Report laments the failure of some exchange
specialists to "lean against the wind." When the market is moving
toward a new equilibrium, as hindsight says it was during most of
the market break, 1 6 specialists serve neither their own nor social
purposes by leaning against the wind, although, of course, that
would benefit certain individuals. From a social viewpoint, if specialists know where the market is ultimately headed, they should
lean with the wind until it reaches the new equilibrium in order to
attain that new equilibrium as promptly as possible. And they have
private incentives to do just that.
Under the efficient market hypothesis, even in its weak forms,
the behavior of specialists who were buying on net before the market reached a new equilibrium was as injurious as net sales by specialists after the new equilibrium had been passed. Either sort of
behavior delays the stabilization at a new equilibrium, so either one
prolongs the period of erroneous investment decisions that result.
Yet to the Brady Commission the former is "good" behavior, while
the latter is "bad."' 7 In retrospect one can surely find instances in
which specialists sold at prices below the ultimate, new equilibrium,
and others in which they bought at prices above the new equilibrium. But that will have proven privately costly to them, and so it
indicates only that the foresight of specialists is imperfect, as would
have been the foresight of anyone caught in the midst of the decline.
There is no externality worth worrying about. Because such trading
is privately costly to specialists, one may assume the specialists
themselves will undertake any improvements in their techniques
that are worth more than they cost. It is doubtful that a regulator
could adopt a superior modus operandi.
See Brady Report, supra note 1, at 15-41.
16 Two-thirds of the fall in the DJIA between the peak on August 25, 1987 and the
trough on October 20, 1987 had not been recovered by August 25, 1988.
17 Actually, the Brady Commission laments net sales by specialists that occurred
either after the new equilibrium had been passed-a genuine social bad-or before the
new equilibrium had been reached-a social good. The Brady Commission seems to
view market specialists as some bizarre insurance mechanism that permits investors to
capture the benefits of every increase in securities prices, but absorbs all the losses
whenever the securities prices decline. As I see their role, specialists are merely inventory managers, and as such enable markets to function continuously even when buyers
and sellers do not appear on the market in perfectly offsetting flows. Inventories are
extremely valuable economic tools, but they are quite distinct from the mechanisms of
the insurance industry.
15
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Even if one assumes that the events of October were entirely
the result of the bursting of a speculative bubble, and that no new
information was implicated at all, the appropriate response would
seem to be rather trifling in comparison with the proposals of the
Brady Report. The appropriate guard against similar events occurring in the future would seem to be better definition of the mechanism through which the bubble forms, and wide distribution of a
concise and clear explanation to the public. Maybe "bubble warnings" could be issued by anyone wise enough to foresee onealthough one wonders why that wise person would not simply sell
short, make a fortune, and help initiate an early bursting of the bubble while it was still small. Most investors are risk-averse, and would
simply withdraw into a "safe-harbor" whenever a credible bubble
warning was issued. If some investors are willing to gamble on being better than most at timing a break-and a gamble is exactly what
a net long position would imply when a bubble was in existence-it
would seem inappropriate to gear the regulatory structure simply to
prevent the gamblers from exercising their wishes.
But if new and better understanding is the solution to speculative bubbles, no additional regulatory structure is implied. The
SEC, for one, already possesses ample authority to undertake and
publicize studies of speculative behavior, while universities and investment banks require no authorization in the first place-at least
not in this country.
A similar response seems called for to deal with the inappropriate reversals and eventual overshoot of the market during the market break. After all, that is hardly a new phenomena. If such events
could efficiently be predicted with greater precision (that is, if there
was anything a new regulator could do to prevent them at a cost
worth bearing) other people in the market would have taken advantage of the opportunity already-and would now be wealthy.
Hence, while continued investigation of the phenomena is difficult
to oppose in principle, institutions that are already in place seem to
possess adequate authority and incentive to continue at an appropriate rate a process long since initiated.
A problem that did arise during the 1987 market break, and
that apparently was related to a new-found speed of communication,
arose from an imbalance of communications. The rate at which the
electronic technology at the exchanges could cope with information
flowing in from outside was less than the rate at which the outside
world could feed in the information. The imbalance contributed to
long delays in executing orders, and thus to substantial deviations
between price quotations when orders were placed and the transaction prices actually realized when the orders were executed. That,
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of course, leads to poor investment decisions of another sort-not
directly with respect to real investment, but with respect to portfolio
management decisions. Moreover, those investors with better access to new communications equipment had better luck at getting
their orders executed than those who were still relying on older
technologies-such as simple telephone conversations-at least
early in the break.
But the appropriate response to such an inability of the exchanges to cope with a burst of incoming orders would seem to be
either none or private. It does not make sense to build storm cellars
in counties where tornadoes occur once a century, even if one has
just hit one of the county's towns. And it does not make sense for
exchanges to invest in more sophisticated and more expensive electronics if the imbalance discussed in the paragraph above is rare.
If it does make sense to update the communications technology
of the exchanges, however, and very possibly it does, the planning
and implementation can sensibly be made by the exchanges themselves. The exchanges have a profit motive for making good decisions about how much, what kind, and how soon, and about the
appropriate level of communications inter-ties to form among independent exchanges. Supplanting markets with regulation is usually rationalized in an abstract setting by hypothesizing external
effects that no private individual can internalize profitably, but it is
difficult to detect such an externality here.
In contrast, a government regulator will respond to political incentives. Political responses tend to be more episodic than market
responses, less expert, less dynamically sensitive to the evolution of
the social and technological environment, and more prone to become hostage to special interests and unrelated policy concerns.' 8
Furthermore, in the absence of a revealed Pareto-relevant externality,1 9 a regulatory "solution" creates rigidities that can frustrate attempts to reach the best solution. 20 Anything that a
regulation is effective at mandating, a private institution is capable
of selecting voluntarily. No option is lost by failing to mandate a
specific action. In the absence of an externality that cannot be pri18
Some evidence indicates that regulatory efforts retard rather than accelerate the
implementation of new technology. See Macey & Haddock, Shirkingat the SEC: The Failure
of the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 315.
19
Buchanan & Stubblebine, Externality, 29 EcONOMICA 371 (1962).
20
If the regulatory action leads to a demonstrable improvement over the preexisting situation, its proponents will trumpet the "success" of the regulation. Such a tack
ignores the proper standard of comparison, which is not inaction, but rather includes
the private actions that would have occurred had they not been preempted by the regulation. Unfortunately, the counterfactual cannot be observed directly, since the regulatory mandate will insist on the mandated state of the world.
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vately internalized, 2 ' the profit motive leads individuals to attempt
just such a selection unless another option is superior. If the initial
choice is mistaken, private parties can quickly revise their selection,
and competition among them will promote such a revision by the
ultimately successful individual.
In contrast, if a mandated regulatory response is mistaken, private parties are compelled to select it nonetheless. And since regulatory agencies are legal monopolies, proximate competition cannot
correct the error. If competition is to play any role at all, it must
come via competition for the jobs of elected officials who oversee
the agency. But that sort of competition will be seriously diluted
among all sorts of other political concerns. Legislators rarely if ever
win or lose seats because of a failure to keep a tight enough rein on
22
some "independent" regulatory agency.
It is also claimed in the Brady Report that small investors were
particularly disadvantaged by communications failures. During the
market break, small investors, who lacked direct ties to securities
markets, often could not get their orders executed for substantial
periods. In the terminology of the Brady Report, investors could
not withdraw from the market in a timely fashion.2 3 In some instances, that phenomenon arose from a straightforward inability of
the system to process orders at a rate equivalent to the rate at which
investors were trying to execute them. But in the over-the-counter
market the inability of investors to execute orders sometimes arose
from another source-the total disappearance of market makers.
Because nobody in the over-the-counter market has an obligation to
make a market, many of those who ordinarily do simply decided not
to do so during the market break.
But the failure of such individuals to make market implies that
they were trying to evaluate the ultimate impact of the break.
Otherwise, they could simply have moved to the new equilibrium
price but continued to make market, thus earning the bid-ask spread
on all the transactions that, in fact, they failed to make.2 4 Moreover,
21
Coase shows that, though it is child's play to observe some externality-producing
situations (and imagine countless others), it is all too frequently ignored that the vast
majority will be internalized by cognizant human beings. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3J.L. ECON. 1 (1960).
22
See McChesney, supra note 5.
23 See Brady Report, supra note 1, at 48.
It seems to have escaped the notice of the Commission members that to the extent
that one of these people had found a way to withdraw at a higher price than he actually
received, that would have meant that someone else would have taken a bigger loss. In
other words, the complaint is merely one that the losses were not distributed in some
alternative way. The Report makes much of the undeserved losses that some individuals
suffered, but says little about who deserved to absorb those losses instead.
24 This is evidence that the efficient market hypothesis must be adopted in a weak
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investment banking firms most often are those who serve as market
makers for over-the-counter securities. Since the opportunity cost
of their resources had temporarily increased as the firms scrambled
to keep abreast of events occurring on the exchanges, their withdrawal from the typically lower-volume over-the-counter markets
may well have represented an efficient reallocation of resources.
Even with respect to the organized exchanges, where the markets for individual securities continued to function most of the time,
the concern for small investors is largely misplaced. According to
the Brady Commission, a limited number of investors seemed to
drive the market down. But that observation is an implication of the
efficient market hypothesis. Most investors place funds in securities
because the .life-cycle of earnings does not mirror the life-cycle of
consumption too closely. Parking savings in securities for the
stream of dividends and capital gains they yield is superior to parking them under the mattress. Only a few investors "play" the market, trying to make money more rapidly than the typical investor by
buying before a market rises and selling before it falls. 2 5
Such a distribution of investor types is sensible. Information is a
public good, and so for any one security only a few individuals
should make the substantial investments necessary to collect and appropriately process the complex flows of information that arrive into
the market. When the information indicates that little change is
called for, these "information specialists" have no incentive to
trade, and the trading activity overall will then be dominated by
portfolio adjustments that "time-function traders" make while
bringing their fluctuating incomes into balance with their even more
variable expenditures.
The activities of time-function traders will be largely unchanged
by inflows of new information-they cannot hope to be first to learn
of it, so all profit would be drained before they could act. 26 But the
behavior of those few individuals 'who specialize in processing information will be affected by new information. Since, by definition,
they are the first to learn and understand the new information, they
can profit by acting on it. Hence, the proportion of transactions that
involve information specialists will increase with the rate of new inenough form to embody a period for information digestion that is measured in days,
even weeks, in some instances. But while such an observation has some intellectual implications, it seems to have no regulatory ones.
25
See, e.g., H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
26 Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, With an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. ECON. 311 (1987) [hereinafter Regulation on Demand]; Haddock & Macey, ControllingInsider Tradingin Europe andAmerica: The Economics of
the Politics, in LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL REGULATION 149 (J.M.
Graf von der Schulenburg & G. Skogh eds. 1986) [hereinafter ControllingInsider Trading].
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formation inflow. This only implies that people try to exploit their
comparative advantages, and that is both privately and socially
appropriate.
It is claimed in the Brady Report, and I will accept as fact, that
the clearinghouse arrangement in the securities market was
threatened by insufficient liquidity until it was rescued by the Federal Reserve System. In particular, since debiting and crediting of
accounts takes time, some participants were threatened with insolvency because they were not receiving credit due promptly enough
to maintain adequate balances with the clearinghouse to cover margin calls on other positions. This problem is alleged to have been
particularly acute because different clearinghouses provide their
services for different securities market segments, and the different
segments maintain interlinks that were too tenuous.
But private institutions operating in the securities markets have
an incentive to avoid temporary breakdowns of their clearing arrangements. Their world would not collapse if the clearinghouse
became overloaded, but trading would be slowed or halted while the
failure was rectified, with a loss of commissions and trading opportunities in the meantime. If a regulator can imagine and implement
an alteration that makes such a breakdown less likely, why cannot
the private institutions imagine and implement the same alteration?
Perhaps the Brady Commission's concern about the clearinghouse mechanism is, in fact, well-placed. Perhaps the private incentives are not strong enough to induce an appropriate revamping. A
private revamping of the clearinghouse mechanism would entail private costs, but experience reveals that the Federal Reserve will bail
out the clearinghouses at moments of crisis, as it did in October of
1987. If that is the source of a problem, 27 however, the appropriate
alteration in public policy would be to direct the Federal Reserve to
take a hands-off approach in the future, and to announce such an
alteration in policy to the exchanges. 28 That would give exchange
institutions full incentive to take efficient advantage of technical op27

I suspect that a least a good part of the problem (and conceivably all) is simply

that the clearinghouses have not completely adapted to new communications technology
and to new market segments. Private adaptation will take time, but probably less than a
regulator would take to do the same task.
28 Clearly, it is desirable for the Federal Reserve System to insure that a sudden and
substantial decrease in liquidity does not occur economy-wide. The "quantity theory of
money" implies that such an impact on liquidity would be mirrored by a substantial
decrease in the rate of economic production. But that does not imply that infusions of
liquidity need go directly to clearinghouses. Nor does it imply that the liquidity that
does reach the clearinghouses through private banks should be priced at anything other
than what the market dictates for other demanders of similar riskiness. In other words,
the plight of the clearinghouses did not imply that they should be blessed with preferential treatment by the Federal Reserve.
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portunities. Contrary to the suggestions of the Brady Report, 29 the
"Fed" needs no overarching new regulatory authority over securities exchanges to carry out such a task.
Finally, the Brady Report suggests coordinating margin requirements across exchanges, and coordinating "circuit breaker
mechanisms"-trading halts and the like. These are the most difficult suggestions to dismiss. If it is desirable to have unified margin
requirements and unified trading halts, then they will not arise without coordinated action among the various market segments. A high
margin requirement or a trading halt in only one exchange will
merely divert transactions onto other exchanges, so that the exchange with the most lenient attributes will determine the de facto
attributes for all exchanges. It remains to be shown, however, that
this competition among exchanges is socially injurious.
Suppose, however, that one or both can be shown to be injurious to investors. If that is so, some capital that would otherwise be
invested in securities will be diverted to other uses. Consequently,
firms that wish to use the capital markets to raise funds would like to
guarantee that their securities would be traded only on exchanges
with appropriate margin requirements and/or trading halt protocols, because that would increase the price for which they could sell
their securities when they are issued.
But if my reasoning is correct, what is wanted is a modification
of SEC policy that now permits cross-listing of securities by one exchange whenever the security is listed on another exchange. 3 0 The
appropriate modification would require that the firm whose securities are to be cross-listed authorize the cross-listing. In a similar
fashion, firms should be enabled readily to delist their securities
from an exchange whose trading practices begin to displease
them.3 1 If the firms issuing securities could confine their listings to
the exchange(s) which they selected, competition among exchanges
29

See Brady Report, supra note 1, at 62-63.
A security comes to be traded on an exchange in one of two ways. A
company may file an application with the exchange and be accepted for
listing. Alternatively, subject to SEC approval, an exchange unilaterally
can trade securities not listed on that exchange, regardless of whether the
issuer has applied for or even desires a listing with the exchange.
Macey & Haddock, supra note 18, at 329 (citations omitted).
31
[E]xchange rules, with full SEC support, make it extraordinarily difficult
for a listed company to delist voluntarily.... The NYSE delisting guidelines, which an issuer must satisfy under section 12(d) of the 1934 [Securities Exchange] Act before applying to the SEC for deregistration,
provide that two-thirds of the issuer's shareholders must vote to delist,
and no more than ten percent can oppose such delisting. Furthermore,
the [Securities and Exchange] Commission sometimes requires a majority
vote of the shareholders per capita.
Id. at 350 (citations omitted).
30
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would lead to an optimal configuration of margins and trading halts,
as well as other improvements in exchange practices. Again, no new
regulatory authorization is required, just an alteration of the rules
under old authorization.
III
A

SPECIAL-INTEREST ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATORY

PROPOSALS

In contrast to a public-interest analysis, if the null hypothesis is
that the Brady Report is a special-interest document, the specific nature of the Report's factual predicates are of little interest. The elemental special-interest model focuses on variations in concentration
across interest groups. 32 Ceterisparibus,interest groups that are relatively concentrated have an advantage in obtaining redistributive
regulation, even if the regulation leads to some deadweight losses.
Concentrated interest groups will have more at stake per individual.
That is seen as increasing the likelihood that they can rationally undertake a larger investment to achieve favorable regulation than can
competing groups, such as the general public, assuming that the
costs of organizing are a function of the number of individuals to be
organized.
But then, if the Brady Report is indeed a special-interest document, the elemental model leaves one wondering why the Report
contains any fallacious predicates at all. If relative concentration is
the whole story, the Report would simply say: "The following are
the concentrated interest groups, and our regulatory proposals benefit them in the following ways."
A.

The Complexity Factor

If "mud-slinging" campaign tactics have a rational basis, however, it must be because politicians who consistently vote favorably
for proposals that blatantly favor special interests over the publicinterest have a poor expectation of reelection. Even the unconcentrated general public will react negatively if it becomes clear that an
incumbent frequently acts against their interests, even if the per capita cost of each act is modest. Consequently, it would seem that any
organizational advantage concentrated interests have over dispersed
ones is insufficient to explain special-interest regulation. For concentrated interests to dominate dispersed ones in obtaining
favorable regulations, it must be that the concentrated interests suf32 Pehzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. ECON. 211 (1976);
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971) revised
and reprinted in G. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS IN REGULATION (1975).
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fer less from "rational ignorance."' 33 Due to the greater per capita
stake of concentrated interest groups in regulatory outcomes, it is
more likely that the members of the group will actually understand
what the regulatory proposals imply.
Such an observation yields two empirical predictions:
First, regulation favorable to any interest group will have a
higher probability of adoption if the regulated sphere is complex
than if it is superficial. The relevant interest group will already understand the complex workings of their market because that is required to work there successfully. But the general public will be
deterred from acquiring a similar understanding, because the information will be of limited future usefulness to them.
Second, the proponents of special-interest regulation actually
have an incentive to increase the complexity of the regulatory proposals, because the special interests have a comparative advantage
in sorting through the intentionally convoluted reasoning. 34 One
way that complexity can be increased easily is by leaving out steps in
the logic of the argument, steps that are easily filled in by members
of the favored interest group, but which can be discovered only with
difficulty by those with no preexisting institutional knowledge. Note
carefully that the argument will not be intentionally illogical-chance
discovery of obvious illogic would discredit the entire proposal. Instead, the missing steps will be held in reserve, to be publicized one
by one (only as necessary) to discredit critics of the proposals. Moreover, the regulatory proponents actually have an incentive to advertise the complexity of their arguments to dissuade critics and nonfavored groups from even initiating a study of the proposals.
The Brady Report seems suspect on both predictions. First, the
securities markets are indeed difficult for ordinary individuals to understand. The items traded are abstract, trading techniques are unusual if not unique, the speed with which transactions are executed
is staggering, and the markets are highly centralized and beyond the
experience of the vast majority of the public. Moreover, that an interference with the market could impair real, as opposed to nominal, productive investment economy-wide would come as a surprise
to the majority of the population. Second, the circuitousness and
leaps of logic (but rarely overt illogic) of the Brady Report are consistent with the special-interest model, as are the repeated assertions
33
Rational ignorance occurs whenever the expected cost to an individual of acquiring an understanding of some process exceeds the benefits that can be expected to flow
to the individual from that understanding. In that event, the individual will rationally
choose to conserve scarce resources for other opportunities and to remain ignorant of
the process at issue.
34
Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand, supra note 26, at 319-24 make a similar
point in a more formal way.
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(advertisements) that problems of securities markets require a holistic approach, and ought not be addressed at all by those who are
unwilling to understand the entire institutional edifice.
B.

The Regulatory Proposals of the Brady Report

Still, if the Brady Report is to be credibly seen as a special-interest document, it is necessary to account for each of its regulatory
proposals. To do this, it is necessary to identify the interest groups
that are hypothesized to have the favor of the authors of the regulatory proposals. It is commonly hypothesized that the securities exchanges themselves and the market professionals that work on
them-specialists, arbitragers, brokers, etc.-comprise the favored
35
interest group.
The regulatory proposals to be considered include:
(1) A single regulatory agency should supersede the several
that presently have overlapping jurisdiction in the securities markets-at least for the areas of overlap. 36 (2) The single regulator
should be the Federal Reserve System. 3 7 (3) Clearing and credit
mechanisms should be unified. 3 8 (4) Margin requirements should
be made homogeneous across markets. 3 9 (5) A common circuit
breaker mechanism should be adopted across competing exchanges. 40 (6) Improvements in intermarket information systems
4
should be designed and implemented. '
1. Single Regulatory Agency
At present, several separate agencies regulate different aspects
of the securities markets, the most important being the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and the Federal Reserve System. Initially, the various
agencies were intended to regulate largely non-overlapping
35 See, e.g., Jarrell, Change at the Exchange: The Causes and Effects of Deregulation, 27 J.L.
EcON. 273 (1984).

One of the major weaknesses of the special-interest model is that it contains no
internal mechanism for identifying the favored interest group. As a result, the model
seems dangerously close to irrefutability. If one hypothesized interest group is shown
empirically not to gain from a particular regulatory outcome, that does not necessitate
rejecting the model as a whole, but merely rejecting the subordinate hypothesis regarding the identity of the favored interest group. McChesney, supra note 5, has argued that
in at least some instances there is no favored interest group, yet the outcome resembles
that predicted by the special interest model. I shall return to this possibility below.
36 See Brady Report, supra note 1, at 59-63.
37 Id. at 62-63.
38
Id. at 64.
39 Id. at 64-66.
40
Id. at 66-67.
41 Id. at 67.
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spheres, but as new securities instruments and trading techniques
evolved, private organizations that were primarily regulated by one
of the agencies began to encroach on the activities of organizations
regulated by another agency.
Under the special-interest model, agencies are perceived to be
(or at least become) unduly sensitive to the interests of the firms
that the agencies regulate. Consequently, competition among the
agencies can replace (although admittedly in a weakened state) the
competition among fhe private organizations that the regulation was
intended to suppress. In order to halt the newly emerging competition, it is desirable to the various special interests that they be regulated by a single agency. In other words, the regulation then
provides valuable cartel enforcement rather than creating an oligopoly of agencies, each struggling for greater political influence for
itself.
Clearly, any one narrowly defined special-interest would prefer
to have an agency that would allow that group to encroach on other
interest groups, while at the same time preventing the reverse encroachment, and preventing intragroup competition. But it is impossible for each interest group to obtain such favorable treatment,
and a simple curtailment of intergroup and intragroup competition
will often be the best outcome that is attainable. 4 2
2.

The Federal Reserve System as Securities Regulator

During the market break of 1987, the clearing mechanisms,
which are creatures of the exchanges, were severely strained. It appeared that clearing might have to be halted temporarily while debits and credits were worked out. In the meantime many margined
traders would be unable to establish their creditworthiness, and so
would have been unable to trade. Market professionals would consequently have missed profitable trading opportunities.
How nice it would be if an organization that is literally empowered to print money could be given the responsibility for seeing that
the market remained open and functioning on a "orderly basis."
How nice not to be forced to adjust the operations of the clearinghouses to optimally face modem technical realities. How nice not to
face the test of the market, which, of course, sometimes calls for the
actual failure of institutions that prove unable to properly adjust to
market demands. Obtaining the Federal Reserve as the regulator of
the exchanges has obvious advantages for those interested parties
over merely expanding the regulatory overview of the SEC, or one
of the other agencies that is specialized to exchange regulation.
42

See Peltzman, supra note 32.
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Unified Clearing and Credit Mechanisms

If regulated firms are prevented from competing on price, nonprice competition has a tendency to increase until supercompetitive
profits are dissipated at the margin. That dissipation can be eliminated if other product attributes can be homogenized. Hence,
before the airlines were deregulated, even the meals and movies
that could be offered passengers were controlled. In the same way,
the special-interest model would view the proposal to unify clearing
and credit mechanisms as an attempt to suppress non-price competition on those product attributes.
4.

Homogeneous Margin Requirements,

The special-interest explanation for homogenizing margin reqtirements is the same as that for unifying clearing and credit
mechanisms.
5.

Common Circuit Breaker Mechanisms

The same argument applies still again. But in this instance an
interesting side-light exists that merits some exploration. It is unclear that securities-issuing firms, as opposed to securities-trading
firms, benefit from circuit breakers (trading halts) at all. The liquidity of a security is impaired by a trading halt, so one who is likely to
require funds on short notice will be more inclined to select alternative financial instruments if trading halts become more common and
of longer duration. Assume, for the sake of argument, that securities-issuing firms would prefer that trading in their securities never
be halted, ceteris paribus.43 As I argued above, if the security were
traded on any exchange that never halted trading, that would become the effective protocol for all markets. A trading halt on one
market would merely divert trades to the market that was still open,
44
as in fact happened on numerous occasions during October 1987.
But trading halts do not occur randomly. Market professionals
govern the securities exchanges, not investors as a group. Ordinarily some market professional possesses the best information available for the securities in which the professional specializes. When
trading patterns begin to indicate that other market participants
43 Lester Telser argues that prudent trading halts may, in fact, benefit ordinary investors by providing a period during which margins can be reevaluated, thus avoiding a
mechanical selloff by brokers. In that event, security-issuing firms would select an exchange for their securities that would institute trading halts at appropriate moments. See
Telser, October 1987 and the Structure of FinancialMarkets: An Exorcism of Demons, in BLACK
MONDAY AND THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL MARKETS (R. Kamphuis, R. Kormendi &J.

son eds. 1989).
44 See supra text accompanying note 30.
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may temporarily possess information that is superior to that of the
professionals, trading is halted until the professionals can catch up.
In other words, trading proceeds whenever the professionals possess an informational advantage over their trading partners, but it
halts when the professionals are at a disadvantage. If a given security is traded on numerous markets, the most liberal trading protocol
dominates, and the professionals cannot avoid lost opportunities
while they attempt to acquire information.
Seen in this light, the demand for common trading halts is not
just an effort to prevent non-price competition among exchanges
for the business of securities-issuing firms. It is also an attempt to
reduce the relevance of periods during which market professionals
are at an informational disadvantage vis-a-vis their trading partners.
But the latter actions simply redistribute gains toward and losses
away from market professionals in their dealings with other market
participants who may temporarily possess informational advantages.
6.

Improved Intermarket Information Systems

It is difficult to oppose improved information. That seems tantamount to supporting stupidity. But surely many well-meaning
people oppose improved flows of information of certain sorts to the
Russians, the Mafia or Iran. The crux of the matter is not whether
or not one favors a return to the dark ages, but whether or not one
expects the information to be put to socially destructive uses.
Much of the information collected by securities exchanges is
used to detect and punish insider trading. Similarly to the argument
just completed, when insiders trade on the basis of non-public information, market professionals are caught at a disadvantage, unlike
the usual situation in which the market professionals possess an advantage over their trading partners. 4 5 In consequence, in some versions of the special-interest model the market professionals are seen
as demanding that the SEC act to reduce the extent of insider trading. 46 One way to identify suspected insider trading cases is to examine trading records for suspicious patterns-for example, large
trades in a particular security that have been executed shortly before
an unusually large change in the security's price.
The SEC is hampered in its anti-insider-trading effort by poor
information about who is actually trading. For instance, the continuing efforts of the United States to coerce an alteration in Swiss law
concerning numbered bank accounts are overtly an effort to obtain
better information about insider trading in the United States that at
45 Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand, supra note 26, at 318-19; Haddock &
Macey, Controlling Insider Trading, supra note 26. at 151-54.
46 See Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand, supra note 26, at 329.
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present is hidden from the SEC's view. 4 7 In a similar way, an ability
by a single party to spread a given volume of trades over various
market segments makes it more difficult to detect unusual trading
patterns. If so, the SEC and the interest groups that would suppress
insider trading will seek improved information flows across market
segments.
But others have argued that insider trading benefits the economy, quite apart from the redistributive consequences on the exchanges. 4 8 If that is true, one may legitimately oppose the
expenditure of resources for the sole purpose of improving information flows from securities exchanges to a regulatory agency.
In summary, it seems possible to construct a special-interest explanation for each of the regulatory proposals of the Brady Report.
Whether or not one views those constructions as plausible, however,
will likely depend on one's predisposition towards the underlying
special-interest model.
For example, suppose the regulatory proposal of the Brady Report had been that the SEC should be the single overarching regulatory agency. It would have been easy to formulate an argument to
account for that. Indeed, it would seem easier to account for the
SEC in that role than to account for the Federal Reserve. After all,
many of the special-interests hypothesized to be at work already
have a firmly established working relationship with the SEC,
whereas the Fed has a broad constituency of its own that is not yet
entrenched in the securities markets. In a similar vein, a proposal
that intermarket information systems be suppressed would be easily
"explained" as a market segmentation device.
In other words, when viewed critically, the near-irrefutability of
the special-interest model, as presently formulated, begins to
emerge. That does not mean the model is necessarily wrong, only
that at present it is seriously incomplete as a scientific construct.
IV
A

CONGRESSIONAL RENT EXTRACTION ANALYSIS OF THE
REGULATORY PROPOSALS

Perhaps the major difficulties with explaining the Brady Report
as either a public-interest or a special-interest document are accounting for the continuing inaction of Congress in implementing
the recommendations of the Report, and accounting for the apparent efforts of the exchanges themselves to implement private re47 See Haddock & Macey, Controlling Insider Trading, supra note 26.
48 MANNE, supra note 25; Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 857 (1983); Haddock & Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U.L.
REV. 1449 (1986).
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forms ostensibly as a substitute for governmental action. In the
meantime one observes continuing hearings by Congress, statements that drastic action will be necessary, etc.
Contrary to the ordinary public-interest and special-interest
models, McChesney's model predicts just such behavior. 49 McChesney sees regulatory agencies not (solely) as cartelizing devices that
increase the profits of the regulated firms, but also as tools through
which Congress threatens private organizations. The threats, it is
argued, invite the threatened organizations to "pay off" Congressthrough campaign contributions, employment opportunities for favored constituencies, etc.-in order to be spared from the
threatened actions. If the Congressional threats are credible, then
Congress cannot simply say subsequently that "They paid us off, so
we are shelving the action for the time being." The public is not
rationally that ignorant. Instead, Congress must be able to point to
''solutions" to the "problem" that ultimately seem not to require
regulatory intervention. "They managed to put their own house in
order, so it will not be necessary to burden taxpayers with additional
regulatory apparatus at this time."
Under this "rent extraction" scenario, the Brady Report may
ultimately bear little or no fruit in terms of implemented regulations. That will not mean that the Report has had no meaningful
economic impact, however. Paying government not to regulate in a
damaging manner is a cost to private organizations. The observation that the alternative would have proven even more costly implies
only that the economic distortion has been controlled, not that it
has been avoided.
CONCLUSION

In my own mind, I am left finally with no strongly-held conclusion of the proper way to characterize the Brady Report.
If the Brady Report was intended to be a public-interest document, then it seems to be a poorly-reasoned and poorly-informed
one. The recent market break seems indeed to call for substantial
changes in public regulatory policy, but hardly of the form envisioned by the Brady Commission. For instance, the Federal Reserve
System should make it clear that, contrary to its behavior during
October 1987, it will not intervene in a pinch to save clearinghouses
from their own failures to make adjustments in practices as the environment evolves. That will afford the clearinghouses themselves
appropriate incentives to undertake any efficient alterations in their
operations that are required to speed clearing across exchanges.
49

McChesney, supra note 5.
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Similarly, the Securities and Exchange Commission should take
advantage of securities-issuing firms' own incentives to seek efficient
securities trading environments for their issues. That can be done
by permitting the firms to veto cross-listing of their securities by exchanges they have not selected themselves, and by enabling them to
delist more easily than is now possible. Some may counter that such
a policy will constrain competition among exchanges. And it willbut in exactly the same way that any other contractual arrangement
constrains competition after the contract is concluded. That does not
constrain exchanges' incentives to compete ex ante. To the contrary,
it enhances that competition. As it stands today, exchanges do not
have to compete for listings by developing better exchange practices
from the viewpoint of the listed firms.
Alternatively, if the Brady Report is a special-interest document, one wonders why its enactment is being delayed. The general
public seems bored by the entire spectacle of the hearings, so it
seems unlikely that there would be a backlash if Congress implemented the Report's regulatory proposals. Indeed, since the public
is so disinterested in this- matter, it would seem desirable under the
special-interest hypothesis that Congress go about its business very
quietly to avoid attracting attention to an activity which, by hypothesis, is so socially disreputable. Consequently, under the special interest hypothesis the widely-publicized hearing process itself is very
mysterious in this instance.
Perhaps that implies that the rent extraction model is the correct one, or perhaps some combination of models is required. Perhaps those few aspects that deal with transparent matters (e.g.,
bubble detection and warnings) are addressed by the Brady Report
in a publicly-interested fashion. More subtle issues (e.g., seeking a
single regulatory agency) may be motivated by special interests,
while still other proposals (e.g., proposals to remove the New York
Stock Exchange's independent authority to establish its own trading
halts) may be designed to elicit a payoff in exchange for a Congressional failure to act.
In one sense, we are studying the Brady Report too soon, for
we do not yet know what, if anything, will eventually come of it. In
another sense, however, our studies have come too late-the very
fact that the Report was compiled and publicized means that it has
already had an impact. Given the inane nature of the Report itself
when viewed as a public-interest document, along with its blatant
socially harmful intent if viewed otherwise, it seems doubtful that
the impact has been a desirable one.

